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INTRODUCTION 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says, "The use of persuasive speech 
I 
is to lead to decisions. • • • This ls so even lf one ls address-
lng a single person and urging him to do or not to do something ••• 
In other words, we must concern ourselves primarily wlth those actl• 
vltl.es which influence other people to make the declstons we advo-
cate ln cases where a choice ls to be made from two or more alter-
natives. But thla statement merely describes the purpose of the 
rhetorical act. Aristotle further defines his concept of rhetoric 
thus: 
there are, then,.•. three means of effecting per-
suasion. The man who ls to be in command of them must, 
it ls clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to 
understand hum.an character and goodness in their var-
lous forms, and (3) to understand the emotions •••• 2 
Such a concept of persuasion implies.that we must know not only the 
modes of argument, but also the ways ln which people are influenced 
by them and the ways ln which people are predisposed to make their 
decisions. Therefore, the study of rhetoric legltlmately embraces 
the study of many other dlsclpllnes, including inter-personal and 
intra-personal psychology, aoclology, economic declslon-making 
theories, and the theory of games. 
1Artstotle, Rhetoric, 2. ts. 1391bs.10. 
2A1:'lstotle, Rhetoric, 1. 2. 13568 21-26. 
1 
These concepts have been invaluable aids ln our dellneatlons 
of choice-making behavior ln the past and will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be widely used. Through them we have developed a body of 
theory surrounding communication and persuaston which helps us to 
understand which modes of persuasion will work best ln a given slt• 
uation, why dependence upon these modes ls better than dependence 
upon others, what results we may predict, and how confidently we 
may predlet them. Thls body of theory ls by no means complete, 
however. It contains inconsistencies and lmprectslons vhlch stem 
from the nebulous quaUtles of the knowledge from which we hypothe-
size, incomplete justification of the assumptions underlying out 
hypotheses, errors in experimental method and interpretation of. 
data, and the relative youth of the field of study. It ls possible, 
therefore, to Improve our.understanding of the phenomena which sur-
round communication and persuasion by consistently testing our 
theories against experience and by making well-conceived attempts 
to integrate our own theoretical conceptions with theoretical con• 
structs derived from relevant di-sclpUnes. 
Any scientific investigation operates on the premise that cer• 
taln dispositional qualities govern action. Helder has defined 
these qualltles asi 
•••those properties that 'dlspose• objects and events 
to manifest themselves In certain ways under certain 
condltlons. Dlsposttlonat properties are the invari-
ances that make possible a more or less stable. predict• 
able and controllable world. They refer to the relative-
ly unchanging structures and processes that characterize 
or underlie phenomena. 3 
3Fr1tz Helder, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, 
Science Editions, ( New York: John Wiley & sons, Inc., 1958), P• ao. 
.3. 
These properties do not make action predictable ln the sense that 
their presence implies stabl11ty of a particular action, but rather 
in the sense that they are permanent qualltles which affect all, 
or nearly all; of the responses of a person, object, or event. For 
example, both intelligence and "being scatter-brained" could be 
considered dlsposltional qualities of persons. While the former 
might lead to relative uniformity and predlctablllty of action ln 
a specific sense, the latter certainly would not. 
The purpose of this paper wlll be to consider the dlaposltlon-
al qualities of choice-making. We shall be particularly interest• 
ed ln the untested assumptions upon which our predictions that 
cholce-maklng wllt have the properties of consistency and trans• 
1t1vlty have been based. This lnvestlgatlon ls prompted by the fact 
that the realities of cholce-maklng do not seem to colnclde wlth 
the predtctlons we make on the basis of the attributed qualltles 
of consistency and transltlvlty. Our goat will be to develop a 
theoretical explanation of chotce-maklng which ls a more accurate 
descrlptlon of the observed phenomena. If we are successful, we 
will be able to come closer to deflnlng the true dlsposltlonal 
qualities of choice-making; and we as communicators will be at least 
one step farther toward precise predlctlon of the results of our 
efforts. 
In the course of.our lnvestlgatlon we shall find lt necessary 
to discuss the assumptions regarding conslstency and transltlvlty, 
the observations which lead us to doubt thelr validity, a theore-
tical resolution of the contradictions between reality and theory, 
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and an e,cperlmental test of our explanation. Flnalty. we shall 
apply our findings about the general nature of choice-making to 
the fleld of rhetoric. 
CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF TRANSITIVITY 
In the philosophic and economic literature of Western culture, 
the assumption has always been made that, unless he 1 s forced to 
do otherwise, man wlll thlnk and make his declstons more or less 
rationally and loglcalty. And, although we see contradictions of 
this prediction every day, we still make thls assumption the basis 
of all of our social sclentlflc theories about choice-making. We 
shall attempt in thl s chapter to trace 1 ts use 1 n current social 
scient1flc theories which are relevant to the fleld of communica-
tion. These theories are drawn, for the most part, from the dls-
clpllnes of psychology, economics and mathematics (game theory). 
Almost all of the theories we shall discuss were originally 
drawn from the economic theories of logical choice .. maktng.· ·· SUch 
theories suppose -that man vlll choose, In an economic context, 
those things whlch will yield the greatest amount of utUlty; mea• 
sured in terms of aesthetic, psychological and physical pleasure, 
economic usefulness, status and the like; for each unit of resources 
expended. They al so assume that he wt 11 make his chol ces tn a log-
lca11y consistent manner, vlthin the context of the system. This 
ls an important quallflcatlon, because lt points out two assumptions 
whlch are made regarding logtcal cholce-maklng ln an economic 
5
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system that do not carry over to other social sctenttfle theories 
of chotce•making. These are the assumptions of perfect knowledge 
of all of the alternatives; and eeteribus paribus or, other things 
being equal. These two assumptions make the economic model valid 
only so long as the system remains unchanged and in so far as the 
person has perfect knowledge of hls alternatives. To the degree 
that either of these elements is mlsslng, logical choice-maklng 
behavior will be impaired. If prices change, or If some other fac-
tor varies, the person wlll operate in a new system; and his choices 
between· systems are assumed to be consi atent only to a very llml t• 
ed degree. For example, lt ls not expected that an lndlvldual 
will choose something he once abhored rather than an alternative 
he once liked in a system where only prices have changed.4 Since 
we do not often operate in static sltuatlons and since we must of-
ten make decisions on the basls of partial evldence about the alter-
natives, we can readily see that there are limitations to the blan-
ket app11catlon of economic declslon-maklng to other sltuatlons. 
As a matter of fact, the model cannot be applied with any sort of 
accuracy to everyday economic action. Thls ls probably because lts 
intention ls to describe what happens in a pure system whlch ls 
not subject to the ramlflcatlons which affect practical cholce-mak-
lng. To make the theory emplrlcally descriptive, and therefore 
applicable to social declsion-maklng, we must make additional as-
sumptions which are often neglected. This failure has made some 
4A good explanation of the basic economic theories underlying 
consumer behavior may be found ln H.H. Liebhafsky, The Nature of 
Price Theorx, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963), 
Chapters 4 ands •. 
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of our theories of social choice-making behavior less than accurate. 
Gamlng theory, whlch ls of mathematical orlgtn, ls concerned 
with predicting the outcomes and decisions in situations which are 
essentially of an economic nature. That ls to say, gaming situa-
tions involve situations of contest or conflict In which there are 
two or more possible outcomes, the players have definite preferences 
for these outcomes, and each player contrives to play so that hls 
rewards wlll be maximal. It ls presumed that the preferences will 
be consistent within the context of the game and that such prefer-
ences will be transitive and w111 be arranged on an interval scale 
which ls invariant with respect to order-preserving llnear trans-
formations. "Thls means that a player given any three outcomes, 
A, B, and c, can say without ambivalence not only his order of pre-
ference but can also tel1 the ratio of the differences among the 
preferences.' • • • n5 It also makes the economic assumptions of 
perfect knowledge and ceterlbus parlbus within the context of an 
individual game. Gaming theory, then, ls actually somewhat more 
rlgld than economic theory in its prediction of logical, transltlve 
choice since it assumes not only the consistency, transltlvlty, 
perfect knowledge and ceterlbus parlbus of economic theory, but tt 
also assumes an interval scaling which ls not assumed in economic 
theory. It ls an extremely valuable construct, however, because 
it introduces .the notion of bargaining or contingent reward. This 
allows us to discuss declslon-making ln a somewhat more reallstlc 
context. 
5Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas, 
Ann Arbor Science Llbrary, (AM A;roor, Mlchlgan: The Unlverslty 
of Michigan Press, 1966), P• 28. 
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The bargaining concept has been adapted to social choice• 
making primarily by Deutsch and Krauss (1960), Blau (1964). and
Thibaut and Kelley (1959). All three of these adaptatlons also 
assume consistency and rationality of choice in the context of the 
bargaining situation -with the goal of reward maximization. They 
do not, however, assume perfect knowledge or ceteribus paribus. 
In fact, they assume that if a player finds another situation In 
which his rewards are Ukely to be higher, he will break away from 
the original relationship to join the new one, providing that the 
costs of leaving do not negate the rewards that would derive from 
the new relatlonshtp. In this sense, these adaptations assume 
two kinds of chotce--cholces wlthln a relationship and choices be• 
tween relationships. In any case, they assume logical, consistent 
choice patterns in either situation after the manner of economic 
and gaming theory. 
From these relatively precise theories, we turn to the psy-
chological models. These theories, whlle they are less precise, 
often seem to conform better to reality than economic and gamlng 
theories. Thls is possibly because psychologists are more interest• 
ed ln explaining human action as they observe l t rather than as l t 
would be ln a pure system. This means that while human action can 
be predicted, it ls only true in a probablistlc sense; and means 
that our predictions cannot be made in frameworks as rigid as those 
we have already discussed. 
Perhaps the greatest evidence of the theory of cholce-maklng 
consistency and transitivity ls represented ln the body of consis-
tency theories. All such theories imply that a person's choices, 
-9-
at least those which he perceives to be related to one another, 
must be consistent and transitive. If they are not, these theo-
ries predict that the person wlll be compelled to make hls actions 
consistent and transitive by hls psychological need for consls• 
tency.6 Abelson and Rosenberg (1958) ln their theory of symbolic 
psycho-logic predict that lndlvlduals wl11 follow certain psycho• 
logical rules, which correspond very closely to the mathematical 
properties of transitivity, to determine the impllcatlons of past 
attitudes and actions (which are merely overtly expressed attitudes); 
.and that they wlll use these conslderattons to make their choices 
consistent and transitive. This is undoubtedly the most extreme 
of these theories as lt implies that people think and make deci-
sions and choices according to a set of rules which are rlgldly 
logical and conform very closely to sylloglstlc thinking. In later 
work• Rosenberg (1960a, 1960c, 1965a) further develops the concept 
that logical, transltlve choices will be made about re1ated issues 
and objects because of conscious realization of the lmpltcatlons 
of Inconsistency contained ln certain courses of action. McGuire's 
work with loglcal-affectlve consistency (1960a, 1960b, 1960c) lm• 
plies very much the same thing about human choice-making behavior. 
6 'Such a need, in so far as it actually exists, may be culture 
bound rather than an a prlorl :n~ed inherent ln human nature. Data 
are available to indicate that traditional patterns of thlnldng and 
child-rearing In a society will determine, at least partially, 
whether there ts a need for consistency in action and thought. For 
example, see c.I. Hovland, A.A. Lumsdalne, and F.D. Sheffield, 
Experiments on Mass Connnunicatlon, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1949), for their comments on the differences between 
the conslstency-ortented responses of American subjects and the 
complexlty-orlented responses typical of Syrian subjects. 
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He poslts and attempts to prove the hypothesis that if a person 
perceives that two actions or concepts are related, he will make 
logically conslst.ent, transitive choices regarding them. Asslml• 
latlon-contrast theory, developed by Sherif and Hovland (1961) and 
Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (1957), ln theorizing that choices ln 
the realm of belief will be made consistent with certain "anchors", 
make the same sort of assumption about rational chotce-maklng. The 
work in dissonance theory by Festlnger (1957), and Brehm and Cohen 
(1962) implies that lf 1oglcal transitive choices are not made, 
the person will suffer psychological discomfort and wlll attempt 
to make hls declslon consonant ln some way. Thia last work, how-
ever, only Implies that man ls capable of making rational choices 
and that he will tend to do so, not that he will do so invariably,. 
On occasion, psychologists have become so mesmerized by math• 
emattcal and economic regu1ar1t1es that they fall to make allov• 
ances for the lmprecl s1 ons which are inherent ln human actl on. As 
we continue our investigation, we wl11 flnd that such seems to be 
the case with the wholesale adoption of the assumption of consls• 
tency and transitivity ln social choice-making. We shall flnd ln 
the next chapter that there ls much evidence from reaUty to lndl• 
cate that people do not always make perfectly transitive, consistent 
choices, even 1n actions which are related to one another. In fact, 
there ls some evidence to indicate that under certain conditions in• 
transitivity will occur almost invariably. 
CHAPTER 2 
INDICATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF INTRANSITIVITY 
There may, after all, be as much pressure toward intransitlv-
lty as 1n the other direction. McGuire says, when discussing the 
origins of inconsistency: 
••• the fault may lle in the stars and not ln our• 
selves. The notion of a society free of inherent con-
tradictions 1s going out of fashion. Cognitions that 
reflect an inconsistent social world •• • must be ln• 
ternally contradictory. People are cast ln conflict-
ing roles. They are called upon to serve God and man 
when the two may be at odds. • • • And even if the 
universe is inherently consistent in the eyes of God, 
man sees only a sample of information and so, unaware 
of the higher synthesis, he may be left wlth a7contra• diction 1n his partial and even biased sample. 
In such a universe, it might be more reasonable to assume that lr-
ratlonallty and lnconslstency ~ould be the natural order rather 
than the~:tendency toward consistency and transitivity which we have 
always assumed. Phllosophlca1 speculations aside, houever, we have 
much objective information to suggest that 1ntransltlvity is a re-
latively common occurrence~ 
Even the consl stency theorl sts, mille lndlcatlng a need for 
7wuuam J. McGuire, ttThe Current Status of Cognitive Consis-
tency Theories," 1n Martin Fishbein, ed., Readings in Attitude 




consistency, indicate that there may be pressure ln the opposite 
direction. Festlnger, for instance, claims that when forced to 
choose among several appealing alternatives the lnd1v1dual will 
have post•declslonal regret in many cases, even if he has chosen 
. 8
the alternative whlch ls most consistent with his other cognitions. 
If the person has post-decisional regret, or dissonance, in such 
a case, it would seem to indicate that he had at least some desire 
to choose another~ less consistent, alternative. In fact, the 
whole dissonance theory, while lt postulates consistency, logically 
implies that the tendency to choose inconsistently exists at least 
to some degree. Otherwise, there would be no occasions upon which 
a person would feel dissonance at all, and therefore be compelled 
to reduce lt, except ln cJses of forced choice. The consistency 
theorists, however, do not consider whether or not consistency ls 
the "natural" tendency. They merely contend that it ls the choice 
tendency with which man ts most psychologically comfortable. 
Nor does translttvlty follow by necessity from a mathematical 
definition of preference~ If preference ls defined as the greater 
probablllty of accurrence of one choice over another, then we may 
wrt te xPy, xiy, or yPx according to whether p(x) >, ., or < p(y). 
We shall use the notation p(x/x,y) to mean the probablllty that x 
is chosen from the set of x and y.9 
8Leon Festlnger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance; (Stanford, 
CaUf.: Stanford University Press, 1957), P• 22. 
9 .
In this context we shalt use probability strictly ln the 
sense of relative frequency. 
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From this definition we may attribute certain qualities to pre-
ference and indifference. The first of these is that a person 
will either prefer x toy, prefer y to x, or remain indifferent to-
't1ard the two alternatives. The second 1s that a person will be in-
different between x and x. The third ls that if a person ls lndlf-
ferent toward the alternatives x and y he will also be indifferent 
toward them when their order ts reversed~ The primary utlU.ty of 
this statement is to permit mathematical manipulations whlch in-
volve reversing the indifference statement. The final statement 
follows from the first. If a person prefers x toy it lmplles that 
he does not prefer y to x. In other words we can say that our de-
finition of preference is such that:·.the preference relation exhlblts 
the qualities of trichotomy~ reflexivity and symmetry for I and 
anti-symmetry for P~ 
It does not follow, hoRever, from our definltlon that either 
P or I is transitive. This meAns that we cannot say under all con-
ditions that if a person prefers x toy and prefers y to z that he 
will of necessity prefer x to z. The same thing may be said of the 
indifference relation. The transitivity for P and I only follow 
when the choice is being made from elements of the same set.10 A 
10A mathematical proof of this statement ls as follows. From 
the deflnltlon of preference above we may attribute the following 
qualities to .P and I.
(1) One and only one of xPy, xiy, and yPx holds. (Trichotomy). 
(2) xix. (Reflexivity for I). 
(3) xiy implies yix. (Synnnetry for I). 
(4) xl?y implies not-(yPx). (Anti-symmetry for P). 
However, it does~ follow from a strict definition of preference 
that either P or I ls transitive, i.e. that: 
(5) xPy and yPz imply xPz. Or, 
(6) xiy and yzz· imply xiz~ 
Such statements follow only when we attribute differential utility 
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brief example may serve to make thls prlnciple clearer. Saying 
that a person will choose eternal damnation of his soul from the 
set (eternal damnatlon of the soul, disgrace) and that he vlll 
choose disgrace from the set (disgrace, stupidity) does not 
necessarily imply that he will choose eternal damnation of his 
soul from the set (eternal damnation of the soul, stupidity). 
Such a relation asswnes that each of the items has a constant uti• 
1tty which it assumes ln all sets in which it appears. Such a pre-
sumption is valid only when all the alternatives are from the same 
set and the set is ordered simultaneously. So• we must conclude 
that while transitivity may follow with the addition of certain 
conditions, it does not become a necessary conclusion of the defi• 
nitlon of preference. Such a conclusion means that since transl• 
tlvlty does not follow by necessity from the definition of prefer-
ence in some of the cases in which ve are required to indicate our 
preferences, lntransitlvlty may be exhibited without doing violence 
to the mathematical. deflnltlon of preference. 
We certainly, it is pointed out by K.J. Arrow, cannot depend 
upon transitivity ln collective declslon-maklng, although it may 
to the alternatives. which we shall see tater ls impossible ln some 
cases. The fact that transitivity is not a necessary conclusion 
from our definition of preference becomes.more readily obvious if 
these statements are made in terms of probabilities. 
(5 1 ) p(x/x,y) > p(y/x,y) and p(y/y,z) > p(z/y,z) imply p(x/x,z)>p(z/x,z). 
The above statement is not true because the probabilities are cal-
culated with respect to different fundamental probability sets. 
The statement is true only for the trlchotomous set. 
(5'') p(x/x,y,z) > p(y/x,y,z) and p(y/x,y,z) > p(z/x,y,z) imply 
p(x/x,y,z) > p(z/x,y,z). 
Therefore, we cannot say that transttlvlty follows from the deflnl• 
tlon of preference in all cases. Q.E.D. 
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occur. In fact, we quite often encounter the 0 voting paradox" ln 
collective choice-making situations. 
Suppose there ls a community consisting of three voters, 
and thls community must choose among three alternative 
modes of social action •••• In analogy with the usual 
utility analysis of the individual consumer under condl• 
tlons of c·onstant wants and variable price-income situa-
tions, rational behavior on the part of the community 
would mean that the community orders the three alternatives 
according to its collective preferences once for all, 
and then chooses in any given case that alternative 
among those actually available which stands highest on 
this 11st •••• Let A, B, and C be the three alter-
natives• and 1, 2, and 3 be the three individuals. Sup-
pose individual 1 prefers A to B and B to C (and there-
fore A to c), individual 2 prefers B to C and C to A 
(and therefore B to A), and individual 3 prefers C to A 
and A to B (and therefore c to B). Then a majority pre-
fer A to B, and a major! ty pr_efer B to c~ If the com-
munity 1 s to be regarded as behaving rationally, we nre 
forced to say that A 1s preferred to c. But in fact a 
majority of the community prefer C to A.11 
'thus, in the literal sense, at least, we cannot expect transitivity 
in collective choice-making. 
One of the earllest, and most often neglected, studies which 
indicates that intransitlvity _exists at the level of the individual 
was done by A.H. Martin in 1922. After having subjects indicate 
their preferences in situations where one alternative was definite-
ly preferable to the others, where the alternatives were almost 
equally desirable, and where the choice was unimportant to the sub-
jects, he found that intransitivity of preference patterns occurred 
at all levels. It was more often observed, however, in the last 
two conditions of the experiment, where the subjects had to indi• 
cate their preferences in cases where the alternatives were almost 
11Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, (NW 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Incl, 1951), pp. 2-3. 
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equally desirable and where the choice itself was relatively un-
important. In these cases, subjects showed far less confidence 
ln their choices and a significant tendency to change their rank• 
ings of the alternatives when asked to rate them a second tlme.12 
Another experimental effort which lndlcates that lntransl• 
tivi ty exists on the individual level was done by Kenneth May ln 
1954. Subjects were to make choices between pairs of hypothetical 
marriage partners ·taken from a set of three such partners, x, y, 
and z., The partners were described ln terms of wealth (zxy), 
looks (yzx), and lntelllgence (xyz).' After havlng been confront-
ed with the alternatives ln pairs and having Indicated thelr pre-
ferences ln that context, the subjects were asked to rank all 
three. The results indicate that lntransittvlty was present. 
If group preferences be defined by majority vote, the 
results indicate a circular pattern, since x beat y 
39 to 23• y beat z by 57 to 5 and z beat x by 33 to 
29. The number of lndlvlduals havlng each of the pos-
sible patterns was xyz: 21; xyzx: 17; yzx: 12; yxz: 
7; xzy: 1; zyx: 4; zxy: o; and xzyx: o.13 
It ls impossible to tell from his results exactly how many of the 
subjects showed intransltlvlty with respect to the paired choices, 
but he does indicate that at least 30 of the 62 subjects showed 
12A~H. Martin, "An Experimental Study of the Factors and Types 
of Voluntary Choice," Archives of Psychology, 1922, No. 51. 
13Kenneth o. May, 0 Intransltlv1ty, Utility, and the Aggregation 
of Preference Patterns," Econometrica, V.' 22, No. 1, January, 1954, 
P• 6. 
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some intransl tlvl ty.14 
We have seen that the posslblllty of lntransltlvity ls logi-
cally lmplled ln both our current consistency theories and ln 
the mathematical deflnttlon of preference; as well as that lt does, 
in fact• exist both in the aggregate and at the individual level. 
Given the absence of force, economic theory would explain these 
intransitlvltles as elther a change ln one or more of the 
Marsha111an uttli ty parameters••! .e. tastes, income, prlces, and 
so on--or ln terms of indifference. It ls probable that we can 
explain many of the lntransltlvltles we have encountered in terms 
of the same sorts of indifferences. 
14 • Ibld•t P• 7~
CHAPTER 3
INDIFFERENCE AS IT RELATES TO INTRANSITIVITY 
Indifference may be described in terms of lndlfference curves. 
These curves are such that along any one of them the consumer will 
derive constant utility. In other words, he w111 be lnd!fferent 
to any combination along a glven curve. His total utility will 
change only lf he moves to a higher or lover 1ndlfference curve. 
By definition he will operate at the highest level of utility, or 
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Figure 1 depicts the situation in whlch a consumer has an in-
come line represented by the budget line X'Y'. This ltne ts drawn 
by finding the points X' and Y', which correspond to the amount of 
each of the goods the consumer could buy l f he devoted all of ht s 
income to that good alone, and joining the two points. The curves 
I1 to I 3 represent differing levels of utility, which we may define 
for our purposes as satisfaction. In reality, there are an infinite 
number of these curves, representing an infinite number of levels 
of utility or satisfaction. In practice, ho'W'ever, we dr~w only a 
few of these lines to represent the relative orderings of prefer-
ence levels. In Figure 1, the consumer will choose to operate on 
curve I 2 because it is the highest level of satisfaction he can 
reach within the limits of his income. 
We may explain social dlfferentlatlon in terms of a similar 
indifference model. Arrow, Thibaut and Kelley, and Blau have al-
ready begun the translation of social action into economic terms. 
In fact, Blau has already used the indifference model to explain 
which of several bilateral monopoly bargalnlng relations will be 
chosen.17 Thibaut and Kelley have theorized that the lndlvldual 
w111 act as an economic man ln social situations to obtain the 
greatest social reward ~t the smallest cost.18 Such suppositions 
w111 form the basis for our own model. 
17Peter M. Blau, Ex.chge and Power in Social Llfe, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), PP• 171-78. 
18John w. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology 
of Groups, (New York: John Wiley & sons, Inc., 1959, PP• 9-30. 
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We shall operate from a fa, basic assumptions. Our previous 
discussion indicates that people are capable of expressing defi• 
nite preferences for some social relationships; and that such 
preferences are based on the social utility or reward of these 
relationships. In other words, an individual w111 find relatlon-
shlps which yield equal amounts of satisfaction equally desirable. 
A corollary to this assumptlon ls that the individual will also 
be indifferent to some relationships, 1.e. they will glve hlm 
equal rewards or utilltles. A second assumption ls that he wlll 
tend to become satiated by the rewards from an actlvlty so that 
hls reward increment for each added increment of parttclpatlon 
will become smaller as his participation rate increases. In other 
words, he will experience dlmlnishlng marginal utility as hls 
partlclpatlon goes up. We shall also assume that, although an ln•. 
dlvtduat•s indifference pattern contains all possible sets of out• 
comes, he will be prevented from reaching his highest possible 
lndifference level by certain personal and social limltatlons. 
Just as the lndlvldual 1n society must operate within a mone-
tary budget, he also must operate within a "social budget" which 
reflects personal and social factors which prevent hls reaching 
his highest possible indifference level. We shall refer to this 
sort of budget as the social parameter, SP. Ye shall assume that 
Just as one's financial parameters may change from time to time, 
so may one's social parameter change, allowing hlm to reach a high-
er level of social satisfaction or forcing him to a lower one. The 
SP, as a matter of fact, might be ln a state of almost continual 
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flux because of lts complexity and because of the changeable na-
ture of personalltles and social conditions. It includes such 
factors as lnhlbltlon, personal ability, level of aspiration, 
societal regulation or dlserlmlnatlon, geographical or other phy-
sical limltatlons, tastes, interpersonal pressure--in short, any 
factor which would increase or decrease one•s possibility of at-
taining hls highest possible indifference level. 
This model.will operate to explain choice-making Ofi both the 
interpersonal and lntrapersonal levels. Let us suppose that 
Foghorn Zilch has some choices to make. On a given Friday night 
he may choose either to go out wlth the boys or to go out with 
Jane or Mary~ He prefers golng out with Mary to going out with 
Jane and prefers going out with Jane to going out wlth the boys. 
But let us suppose that when he calls Mary she says that she al-
ready has a date with Hero the football player on Friday. This 
puts one of his choices above hls social parameter since he does 
not w1 sh to go out wl th Mary badly enough to suffer a cauU flower 
ear for the privilege. In other words, the marginal costs of a 
date with Mary are greater than the marginal rewards~ He there-
fore calls Jane who says that she would love to go. However, she 
will not express a preference for going to a movie or going bowl-
lng, possibllltles to which Foghorn himself 1s lndlfferent. He 
likes them equally well, they yield equal satisfaction or utility 
to him, and there is no other activity that will yield a higher 










Foghorn's Indifference Pattern 
Movie 
In this situation, he will probably make an arbitrary choice be-
tween a movie and bowling which are on the indifference curve mark-
ed Jane. If, however, he chooses a movie, the next tlme he goes 
out he will probably choose bowling, because although the objective 
ut111t1es of bowling and movies are equal, the marglna1 utility of 
a night of bowling will be greater after he has been to the mov-
ies once. 
Such a model 1 s far more interesting when we use 1 t only to 
consider choices amqng alternatives which have equal or nearly equal 
desirability. Because of our assumption that preferences will 
correspond to utilities, equal desirability implies equal utility. 
In the case where there are two or more alternatives of equal 
utility or desirability which fall on the optimal indifference 
frontier, we may expect that choice among them will be more or 
less arbitrary within the limits of diminishing marginal utility. 
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Therefore, we cannot expect choices or preference indications a• 
mong them to be strictly transitive. In fact, we may expect a 
great deal of intransltlvity or refusal to choose at all in this 
context. 
The reader may object, and legitimately so, that the instance 
in which alternatives are precisely equal in utility ts a rare one. 
This ls probably true. However, it is not practical in the usual 
case to differentiate between precise apd approximate equality. 
Since there are an infinite number of utility or satisfaction lev-
els ln any individual's indifference pattern, the differences be~ 
tween equal and approximately equal utility are probably so imper-
ceptibly small that lt ls not necessary to distinguish beb~een
them for our purposes~ In either case, the alternatives will be
so close to equal desirability that it will be dlfflcutt for the 
individual to delineate one clearly prefet-able alternative. In 
Festlnger's conceptualization, if the individual ls forced to choose 
among the alternatives in the case we have described, he will ex-
perience a great deal of post-decisional dissonance. From this 
analysis we may generalize that the more nearly equally desirable 
an individual perceives the alternatives in a sltuatlon to be, the 
more arbitrary, end, therefore, the more intransitive his choices 
wl11 be. 
Following this llne of reasoning, we shall presume that such 
equal utl11ty may stem either from unimportance of the choice, in 
which case lntransitlvlty ts of little moment, from the length of 
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tlme over which the choice ls made, or from equality of the al• 
ternat1ves ln terms of equal numbers of positively and negatlve-
ly valued, equally salient characterlstlcs. Thus, we may espe• 
clally expect 1ntransltlv1ty to occur ln situations where the 
lndlvldual must choose the best of several ~•good" alternatives, 
or the least evll from a set of "bad" ones. The more nearly any
given situation conforms to thta pattern, the more lntransltivlty 
we may expect the lndivldual to exhibit. 
Let us then, apply our model to one of the lntransltlvltles 
we described ln a previous chapter. In May's experiment, the mar-
riage partners were -descrl bed in such a way that none were super-
ior on the basls of all three charaeterlstlcs. Each was first on 
one dimension, second on another dlmenslon and last on the third 
dlmenslon. If we disregard the time dlmenslon, w'hlch may have had 
some effect ln this experiment, although lt was probably not a 
major one; we find that the subjects were faced with the problem 
of ranking three marriage partners on the basts of descrlptlons 
which were more or less objectively equal. Furthermore, the 
characteristics descrlbed••wea1th, 1ooks, and 1nte11lgence-•were 
probably equally salient characteristics of a marriage partner. 
In such a situation, it would be hlghly·llkety·that the marriage 
partners would fall on the same indifference curve. Therefore, 
we would predl ct from our model that the subjects would tend to 
make arbitrary choices between the two partners in any given pair. 
This decision, because of lts arbltrary nature and because of 
actual lndlfference--that ts, precise equality of deslrabl11ty-• 
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would not be lnternallzed by the subject! Therefore, when faced 
with another pair, lt ls highly likely that the subject wlll make 
an lntransltlve choice. The results of May•s experiment support 
this predlctlon.· Almost half of hls subjects, 30 of 62, exhibit• 
ed such lntransltlvlty. 
The lmplicatlon of this model ls that lf one were to formu-
late a choice situation such that the alternatives easily order 
themselves in terms of preference• one would find more transltlvlty 
of cholce-maldng than ln a situation Where the alternatives are 
nearly equal 1n dealrabl11ty so that lt ls harder for a clearly 
preferable alternatlve to emerge~ This ls the basis upon which 
we formulated a design to test the appllcablllty of our theory~ 
CHAPTER 4 
EXPERI~fENTAL DESIGN 
The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis: A sub-
ject wlll tend to exhibit more lntransltlvlty ln cholce-maklng 
the more diverse, counter-balancing factors he is given about the 
alternatives among which he must choose. A corollary of this hY• 
pothesls ls that ln a situation where a subject ls faced wlth di• 
verse, counter~balanclng information about the alternatives, he 
will tend to exhibit less 1ntranslt1v1ty if hls attentlon 1s fo• 
cused on one of the 1 tems. A chol ce in thl s context ls considered 
to be any lndlcatlon of preference. Intransltlvlty may be defined 
as having occurred when a subject's choices do not mutually agree. 
The vehicle for the experiment was a paired-comparison pre-
ference scale with allowance for indifference. (See Appendix). 
On thls scale, the subject was asked to indicate hls preference 
for one of a palr of resld~ce_hall counselors taken from four de-
scriptions which. he had read. There were six pairs tn all, com-
prising the total possible comblnatlons of the descrlptlons given. 
Each subject rated all slx pairs. Later, he was asked to rank 
the counselors in the order he would pref er them, from f 1rst to 
fourth, lf he were allowed to choose among a11 four. These two 
ratings were compared to determine the degree of transitivity which 
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was present. Perfect translttvlty was indicated by a score of 
zero, and each occurrence of an lntransltlvlty was scored as one. 
The measure 1 tself was three pages long. On the first page 
were descriptions of the four counselors, on the second was the 
palred•comparlson rating scale, and on the third was the rank-or-
der rating scale. There were four conditions in the experiment, 
denoting whether the descriptions o~ the counselors contalned one, 
two, three, or four dimensions. In each of the last three condl• 
tions there were two treatments. In one of these, the subject's 
attention was deliberately focused on one of the dimensions (rule 
enforcement).: The other treatment emphatically lnotructed the 
subject to take all the information given about the counselor into 
account when making hls choices. We shall refer to these as the 
singular and diverse focus treatments, respectively. It was ex-
pected.that in .the singular focus treatment less lntransltlvlty 
would be encountered ln maklng the choices than ln the dl verse 
focus treatment. This prediction was made because the singular 
focus treatment would ha-ve the effect of raising the salience of 
the emphasized characteristic whlle reducing the salience of the 
others. thls would make the alternatives less equally desirable 
than 1n the diverse focus condition. 
the subjects were asked to make their choices on the basis of 
descrlpt1ons of four resldence hall counselors. We chose to de• 
scribe residence hall counselors because the counselor-counselee 
relationship ls one which ls familiar to most college students. 
In our case, especially, the supposition was a valid one. Slightly 
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more than seventy.five per cent of the sample population either 
were living or had lived ln a residence hall. 
The descriptions were developed on the basis of a systema-
tic variation of one to four one-dimensional characterlstica•-
ava11abl11ty for counseling, severity of rule enforcement. age. 
and encouragement of participation in extra-curricular actlvltles. 
'.the characterlstlcs were first developed lndivldually~ then a 
sample of forty-seven Speech I students was asked to rank each of 
the four groups of variations of an individual characterlstlc for 
llkablltty. they ranked the ltems in each group fr0ut one to four•• 
most liked to least llkect. Each characterlstlc variation was then 
assigned a rank of one, two, three, or four on the basis of the 
sample rankings. Finally, in order to insure that the alternatives 
were approximately equal ln attractiveness, the combinations were 
systematically varied so that in the fourth condition each descrlp• 
tlon voutd contain one characteristic of each rank, and, therefore, 
be approximately equal in des1rab111ty. Table 1 shows the varia-
tion system. 
Table 1 
Ranking Variation System for 
C 1 D l ti ounse or escr.n ons 
Aval1abilltv Rule Enforcement At?e Activities 
Counselor A 3 2 4 1 
Counselor B 2 1 3 4
Counselor C 1 4 l 2 3I 
l 
I 
Counselor D 4 3 l 1 2
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The same variation system was used for all four conditions to assure 
uni f orm1 ty. 
The printed instructions which preceded the descrlptlons were 
of two types. The lnstructlons for the diverse focus condition were 
as follows: 
Imagine that you are about to be assigned to a dormitory 
for a school year. You must choose which of the follow-
ing counselors you wish to have as the counselor for your 
living group. You may assume that they are very similar 
ln all but the described aspects. Be very careful to 
take every fact given about the counselor into account 
when making your choice.19 
A slight variation of these instructions was used ln the flrst con-
dltlon. 'the instructions for the singular focus condition were: 
Imagine that you are about to be assigned to -a dormitory 
for a school year. You must choose which of the ~oltow-
lng counselors you v1 sh to have as the counselor for your 
llvlng group~ You may assume that they are very similar 
ln all but the described aspects. Research has shown 
that a student will be happiest in a group where the 
counselor shares hls vlews on how strictly the rules 
should be enforced. Therefore, you may want to weight 
this factor more heavily than others in making your 
choice. 
The descriptions followed these instructions. The counselors were 
ldentifled as A, B, Ct and D. 
The instructions for the paired-comparison rating scale were 
the same ln all conditions. They read: 
Please place a check by the letter of the counselor you 
would choose 1 f forced to choose between the counselors 
in the pairs given. If you are indifferent to a pair, 
(you don't particularly prefer one to another), place 
a check ln the space marked I. Consider each pair se-
parately. Do not skip anx pairs. 
Verbal instructions were given which were designed to discourage 
19The complete measures may be found tn the Appendix. 
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overuse of the indifference category. 
The verbal instructions were uniform for all groups of sub• 
jects. The experimenter told the group that she represented the 
housing authoritles on campus and that she was making a study in 
connection with the revision of the criteria for choosing resi• 
dence hall counselors. She then told the group that they could 
aid in this study by indicating on a questlonaire what sorts of 
counselors they liked best. The following verbal instructions were 
then given: 
1. When you get your questlonalre be sure to read the instructions 
and descriptions very carefully before lndlcatlng your choices. 
2.- You should be careful to reflect your true preferences because 
other people will have to llve with your· choices. 
3. Assume that the counselors described are of your own sex. 
4. Do not turn to page three until you have completed everything 
up to that point. 
The subjects were also asked to indicate thelr ages and whether they 
were living or had lived 1n a residence hall. The first and fourth 
Instructions were glven simply to reinforce the printed instructions. 
The second instruction was given as a mltlgatlon against the over-
use of the lndlfference category. The third lnstructlon was glven 
to eliminate the confusion that might have arisen for the young 
ladies in the sample due to the fact that all of the descriptions 
were written ln the ·impersonal third person singular. The request 
for age and living group information was made to make the cover 
story more realistic and ln the hope that possible aberrations 
might be explained on this basis. 
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The variations among the four condltlons of the experiment 
perhaps bear explanation. The first condition was a cholce based 
on a single dlmenston--avallabillty for counseling. It washy-
pothesized that this method would allow the most clear-cut basis 
for choice. The descrlptlons in the second condition included two 
dlmenslons which were system.atlcally varied according to a pre-
arranged pattern. described ln Table 1, which was the same for 
all of the conditions. The third condltlon descriptions contained 
the added variable of age. The fourth and final condition added 
the variable characteristic of encouragement of partlclpation ln 
rxtra-currlcular actlvltles. The general hypothesis was that the 
first condltton would yield the smallest amount of lntransltlvlty 
and that the number of people showing 1ntrans1t1vlty would increase 
with each cond1tlon. It was further expected that there would be 
a progressively wlder margin of difference between the singular 
and diverse focus conditions ln each of the last three conditions. 
After the data from the orlglnal experiment was gathered• 
a second experiment was done to test the influence of tlme and ar-
rangement upon the amount of lntransltlvlty shown by the subjects. 
The descrlp~lons. scales, and Instructions were the same ones 
which were used ln the orlglnal experiment. The difference was 
that the descriptions were presented two at a tlme in booklet 
form. The last page of each packet was a rating sheet for the two 
counselors described in that booklet. The subjects were asked 
to f111 this out without looking at the descriptions again. After 
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they had read both booklets and had rated the pairs, the subjects 
were asked to flll out the palrect-comparlson scale and the rank-
order scale without looklng back at the descrlptlons. In thls 
version of the experiment, only the descrlptlons from condition 
four were used. It was predicted that the subjects would exhl• 
bit more lntransltlvlty than those in condition four of the orlgl• 
nal experiment. 
OUr general prediction was that the number of persons show-
Ing lntransltlvlty would become progressively larger from the first 
to the fourth conditions and that the margin of difference between 
the singular and diverse focus treatments would follow the same 
pattern. 
CHAPTER 5
METHOD AND RESULTS 
The subjects for the original experiment were sixty-eight 
students who were taking the speech fundamentals course in the spring 
semester., There were nlne subjects ln each of the two treatments 
of conditions two, three, snd four and f:tlelve ln the first condition. 
Two subjects• responses were eliminated because they dld not fol-
low instructions when givlng their ratlngs. 
The measures were administered to one class at a time. Flve 
classes were used. The various conditions were randomly dlstrl• 
buted so that every class had some subjects ln each of the condl• 
tlons of the experiment. Each class was given the uniform verbal 
orientation and instructions which are described earlier in this 
paper. The questlonalres were then dlstrlbuted. The average sub~ 
ject completed the entire measure wlthln fifteen minutes. The 
experimenter was never questioned about any part of the questlonalre, 
although such questions were not prohibited, and no one appeared 
to be having difficulty in responding. This, as well as the fact 
that there were only two cases ln which the responses were not made 
correctly, indicates that the subjects probably understood the in-
structions and were not confused as to what they were to do. In 
two cases, the teacher was given a brief written explanation of the 
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purposes of the experiment so that he could use the experiment 
as a teaching device at his convenience. In the other three cases, 
the experimenter returned to the class to discuss the experiment 
and to answer questions. 
the raw data were in two forms. For each subject, there was 
a set of six responses to paired-comparison scales, lndlcating which 
of the two counselors was preferred, and a ranking listing the coun-
selors 1n order of preference from first to fourth. The following 
ls a typical example of a subject's responses to the palred-com-








From this set of rankings It was relatively simple to derive the 
order of preference for a gtven subject. In the case in the exam-
ple, the order ls ABC D. this order was then checked against 
both the ratings for each pair and the rank-ordering. the rank-
orderlng was also checked for consistency with the paired-compari-
sons. An lntransltivlty was scored in any case where the paired 
ratings dld not agree wlth either the derived or the given rank-
order. · In other words, two kinds of lntransltlvlty were scored•• 
1ntrans1t1vlty among the paired-comparison rankings and intransl-
tlvlty between the palred-comparlson rankings and the given ranking. 
Either of these sorta of lntransltlvity indicates an inability to 
make choices consistent with previously stated ones. In each con• 
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dition, two totals vere recorded--the number of lntransltlvitles 
and the number of subjects who exhibited them. Since lt was pos-
sible for a single subject to exhibit intransltlvlty more than 
once, these totals sometimes differ. A table of the results 
follows. 
Table 2
R Dt Fr '1'h Ex 1 t av a a om e ~oer men
Condition 1 2S 2D 3S 3D 4S 4D Totals 
N in Condition 12 ,g 9 9 9 9 9 66 
N lntransltlvitles 6 0 1 3 3 4 3 20 
N having 
lntransltlvitY 5 0 1 2 2 3 3 16 
% of total 
lntransltlvitY 30 0 5 15 15 20 15 100 
% of subj eets show, 
lrur lntransitlvltv 41.7 0 11 22 22 33 33 24.2 
Probably the most meaningful of these data la the percentage of 
subjects ln a glven condition who showed lntrans1t1vlty. When 
charted on a graph, those data show the following pattern. 















4 Number of 
Condltlon 
Per Cent of Subjects Showing Intransltlvlty 
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On the whole, the subjects exhibited a great deal more tran-
sitivity than was expected. From the results of May•s experiment 
we would have expected close to half of them to have exhibited ln• 
transitivity ln the fourth condltion~ In fact, only about thirty• 
three per cent did so. Th.ls was true ln all.but the first condl• 
tlon, in which the subjects exhlblted more lntransltlvlty than ln 
any other, in direct contradlctlon of the predicted results. It 
is possible that these subjects were not challenged to make care-
ful choices by the extreme simplicity of the descriptions in this 
condition. It 1s also possible that there ls a lover 11mlt to the 
number of variables required to remove the alternatives from thelr 
original condition of equal deslrablllty. If thls ls true, the 
subjects would have just as difficult a time making a declslon and 
ln making consistent decisions when they are given too little in-
formation as in cases where they are given enough diverse, counter-
balancing information to make the alternatives approach equal 
desirability. 
In condltlons two, three, and four, the results support the 
maln hypothesis. With each addltlon of a variable to the descrip-
tion, the number of subjects who exhibit lntransltlvlty increases. 
The results do not, however, confirm the corollary to our hypothe• 
sls. It may be that. l_n this experiment, focusing a subject's at-
tention on one aspect of a description does not lessen the confu-
sion caused by the other factors which are present. 
In the second experiment, sixteen subjects 1n a single speech 
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class were used. lbe sample was divided equally between singular 
and diverse focus treatments. In the singular focus treatment 
there were three, or thirty-seven and one-half per cent, of the 
subjects who showed a total of ten 1ntransltlvlt1es. In the di• 
verse focus treatment, two subjects, or twenty-five per cent. 
showed six intransitlvlties. These results are reasonably con-
sistent with our other results and seem to support the main 
hypothesis. 
CHAPTER 6
PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There were several problems in design that may have had an 
effect on the results of the experiment. The first of these was 
that the characteristics used to describe the counselors were not 
tested for salience.' Ideally, a number of different characteristics 
should have been tested for salience, and the four most sallent 
characteristics used to describe the counselors~ This would have 
made certain that the alternatives were as nearly equally desirable 
as possible. Such a precaution might have made the laboratory de• 
clston more reallstlc~ Had lt been done, our sample would pro-
bably have shown greater lntransltlvity than lt did. At any rate, 
it ts almost certain that the characteristics we did use were not 
equally saU ent. 
Another problem was that neither the written or the verbal 
lnstructlons made any attempt to hide the choice-making nature of 
the experiment. Only the reasons for Which the choice was being 
made were camouflaged •- It might be supposed that had the subjects 
not been aware that they were to make a choice until after having 
read the descriptions, the alternatives might have been more near-
ly equally des1rab1e ln their minds at the time of choice. Since 
our results indicate that equally desirable alternatives probably 
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do lead to lntransltlvlty ln cholce-maklng9 it ls entirely pos-
sible that more cleverly designed instructions might have mltl• 
gated ln favor of our hypothesis. 
A final problem was the arrangement of the measure~ We 
chose to put all the descriptions on the same page and all of the 
paired-comparisons on the same page~ It ls not often that we flnd 
such a conveniently collected set of alternatives or such a closely 
related set of paired-comparlsons in reallstlc experience. Ye 
would probably have more closely simulated reality lf each descrip-
tion and each choice had been on a separate page~ Had we used an 
ari-angement which more nearly simulates reality we might have 
found greater support for our hypothesis. 
The fact that our hypothesis was supported marginally despite 
errors ln deslgn which mitigated in favor of transitivity rather 
than lntransltivlty lends credence to our belief that indifference 
ls an· important factor ln intrans! tl vl ty. This conclusl on has im• 
portant implications for the practlce of rhetoric. 
We have always been concerned with the prior belief patterns 
of our aucUences. The importance of indifference tn the lntransl-
tlvity of cholce•maklng glves us an even greater cause to be con-
cerned with the bellefs of our audiences. The precision vlth 
which we can predict the results of our efforts depends upon the 
precision with which we determine our audiences• prior beliefs. 
the indifference model lmplles that we must not only determine 
neutrality, favorab1Uty, or hostility• but as well we must de .. 
termlne the degree to which the audlence ls hostile or favorable. 
Otherwise we run the risk of presenting only enough arguments to 
raise our alternative to the level of indifference wlth several 
other alternatives, rather than to the level of clear preferablUty 
to other alternatives~ It also implies that we must consider ~-. ·,: 
only those alternatives whlch are within the soclat parameters of 
our audience~ 
Indifference theory, then, ls a useful concept in helplng us 
to analyze ''how far" we must persuade an audl ence to be assured of 
success~ We have always recognized that different audiences re-
quire different amounts of persuasive effort. We can apply the in• 
difference model to our audiences to help us visualize where our 
alternative lies ln the indifference patterns of our audience~ We 
may then make attempts to raise our alternative to the opttmal ln• 
difference frontier while preventing other alternatives from reach-
ing or staying ln that posl tlon. 
APPENDIX 
Th.ls appendix contains the descriptions from condition four of the 
experiment. To find the descriptions for conditions one, two, and 
thr&e, read only the first one, two, or three of the characterlstlcs 
respectively., The singular focus treatment was prefaced with the 
instructions below: 
Imagine that you are about to be assigned to a dormitory for a school 
year~ You must choose 'Which of the fo11ow1ng counselors you wish 
to have as the counselor for your living group.· You may assume 
that they are very similar ln all but the described aspects. Research 
has shown that a student will be happiest ln a group where the coun-
selor shares hls views on how strictly the rules should be enforc-
ed. Therefore, you may want to weight this factor more heavily 
than others ln making your choices. 
The diverse focus treatments were prefaced with these instructions. 
Imagine that you are about to be assigned to a dormitory for a 
school year. You must choose which of the following counselors you 
wlsh to have as.the counselor for your living group~ You may as-
sume that they are very s1m11ar.1n all but the described aspects. 
Be very_ careful to take wery fact given about the counselor into 
account when making your choice;· · 
Condition one used these Instructions: 
Imagine that you are about to be assigned to a dormitory for a 
school year.· You must choose which of the following counselors you 
wish to have as the counselor for your 11v1ng group. You may as-




'l'hls counselor feels that he isn't quallfled to be of help with 
personal problems.' mtenever someone approaches him w1 th a problem. 
therefore, this counselor refers the person to the resident dlrec• 
tor or someone ln the Dean's office since he thinks these people 
can be of more help than he~ He does not enforce the rules very 
strictly. He feels that most of them are unfair to the students 
so he will not report any but the most serious offenders, and then 
only 1f they have more than one infraction• if he has the choice. 
He is a senior but ls older than normal (26 years old) because he 
dropped out of school to work for several years after completing 
his sophomore year ln college. He feels that students should be 
interested ln extra-curricular activities and regularly makes men-
tion of opportunities for such participation to people in his 
group. He takes participation lnto account when making his reports 
to the Dean's office; but such other thlngs as grades, ability to 
get along with others, and over-all adjustment also influence his 
ratings. He makes no effort to discrlmlnate in favor of those who 
participate in extra-curricular actlvltles although they often re-
ceive favorable reports because they are outstanding in other ways 
as well. 
Counselor B
This counselor enjoys having the people Uvlng In his group come 
to hlm for help with their problems~ In fact, he encourages them 
to do so~ His door ls always open and he ls more than v111lng to 
11 sten to any problem, large or small, at all times. He feels 
that rules should be strictly, but fairly, enforced. While he 
does not search for Infractions, lf he sees someone breaking a 
rule or if an offense ls brought to hls attention, he deals with 
lt promptly ln the manner prescribed by the Dean's office~ He ls 
a junior about 19 years old who has attended this school all three 
years. He feels that extra-curricular activities are a waste of 
the student's time and speclfically discourages partlclpatlon by
the students ln hls group. In making his reports to the Dean's 
office he gives the most favorable reports to those who seem to be 
the most serious about their studies and who seem to get along well 
with other people in the living group. He usually glves the least 
favorable reports to those who participate in extra-curricular ac-
tivities because he considers them to be "non-serious" students. 
Counselor C 
It has been thts counselor's experience that lt is more beneficial 
to a person to work out his problems lndlvldually, on his mm. He 
ls, however, v111ing to talk to a student about his problems lf the 
person can show evidence of having worked at solving the problem 
by himself without success. He ls sporadic in enforcing the rules. 
At times he takes little or no action for even the most serious 
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infractlons; but two or three times a year, when he thinks things 
have ttgotten out of hand," he begins to enforce the rules very 
strictly.'· At these times he reports students to the judlclal 
councll for even very minor lnfractlons., He ls a graduate student 
about 23 years old Who did his undergraduate work at another uni-
versity~" He feels that no student can receive the full benefit 
of his college education unless he partlclpates In.a number of ex-
tra-curricular actlvitles during his college years~· He therefore 
encourages hls students to participate in various activities and 
recognizes those who do well by placlng announcements of thelr 
achievements on the floor bulletin board. In the reports he makes 
to the Dean• s office each semester for inclusion ln student flles 
he always gives the most favorable reports to those who engage in 
the greatest·number of actlvltles with the greatest success. He 
gives an extremely unfavorable report concerning adjustment and
lnltiatlve to anyone vho doesn't participate. 
Counse1or D
This counselor feels that he should not have to be bothered with 
the problems · of persons in hl s group. Most of the time he hangs 
a Do Not Disturb sign on his door or ls away from hls room. If 
someone does approach him wlth a problem he acts as though the per-
son has invaded his privacy and seeks to send him to someone else 
or to put the counseling session off lndeflnltely~ He ls extreme-
ly zealous in hls enforcement of the rules. He is constantly on 
the look-out for infractions and investigates any sltuatlon where 
he suspects someone of breaking a rule~ He usually takes firm ac-
tion, espelca11y wlth first offenders. He figures that lf he hands 
out severe punishment the first time, the.person wlll think twice 
about breaking the rule again •. He is 21 years old and a senior. 
He has attended this school all four years; He feels that lt ls. 
not his business to either encourage or discourage partlcipatlon 
1n extra-curricular activities. He seldom, if ever, takes partl-
clpatlon lnto account when making his evaluations of students., He 
feels that students should not be pressured ln this, or any other, 
way to do things that take away from .their study time. In fact, 
one semester he gave the most unfavorable rating ln the group to 
the student body president because he felt that the student was a 
dlsruptlve influence and was making no effort to get along well 
wlth his roommate or the others who lived around hlm. 
-44-
PAIRED•COMPARI SON RATING SCALE 
Please place a check by the letter of the counselor you would 
choose 1f forced to choose between the counselors 1n the pairs 
given. If you are indifferent to a pair, (you don't particularly 
prefer one to the other), place a check in the space marked I.



















List in the order you would prefer the counselors if you were able 
to choose any one of the four given. Put the letter of the counse-
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